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Abstract
This paper identifies endogenous and exogenous indicators of firms’ in-
vestment activity, and examine, in particular, the effect that these variables
have in co-determining firms’ investment decisions.
Two channels of spillovers from sovereign risk to firms’ capital expendi-
tures are defined. The first channel, the “direct channel”, describes responses
in capital expenditures from an innovation in sovereign risk. The second chan-
nel, the “indirect channel”, is a transmission mechanism in which spillovers
from changes in sovereign risk indirectly affect a firm’s capital expenditures
via its capital market risk and profitability. While we observe that the direct
risk channel is of major importance in Emerging and Developing Economies,
it is comparatively small in Advanced Economies. In the case of the latter,
contagion from changes in sovereign risk on firms’ capital market risk plays a
much more important role.
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1 Introduction
For both industrialised and developing economies, the investment activity of
firms plays an important role in maintaining economic prosperity or catching up,
respectively. Besides firm-specific characteristics, such as size, sector and liquidity,
the macroeconomic environment as well as concrete policy measures are crucial in
the decision-making process for long-term investments. While the former is often
modelled using a measure for the level of general economic activity, applying, for
example, the GDP or an industrial production index, the latter depends on the
specific question of interest. In this paper, we aim to estimate the interrelationships
between firms’ capital market risk, profitability and capital expenditures, as well
as the impact that an increase in sovereign risk has on capital expenditures, in
particular. Our research is motivated by the topical discussion of political and
economic uncertainty on investments. Firm executives may prefer to “wait and
see” in times of high economic uncertainty, implying a subsequent decline in
capital expenditures.
Having defined aggregate spillover as the total multiplier effect from sovereign
risk on capital expenditures, decomposition allows identifying two causal sub-
channels. The first subchannel, the “direct channel”, captures all non-second-order
effects a shock in sovereign risk has on a firm’s investment activity. The second
subchannel, called “indirect channel”, captures all effects that sovereign risk has on
a firm’s investments via third-party effects on other endogenous system variables,
i.e., a firm’s capital market risk and its profitability.
The methodological procedure is based on a vector autoregressive (VAR) model
that is modified for panel data and extended by exogenous variables (PVARX).
The idea is to model each of the endogenous variables as a process on its own
and the other system variables’ (both endogenous and exogenous) recent past.
We use the Differential Evolution algorithm developed by Storn and Price (1997)
and adapted to VAR and vector error correction (VEC) models in Maringer and
Deininger (2016) for the selection of parameters during the optimization process.
Economic inference is drawn from estimated parameter values, as well as from
impulse response analysis and multiplier analysis.
For the empirical analysis, we collect quarterly data on firms’ capital expen-
ditures, stock return volatility and the return on capital for a set of more than
5,800 manufacturing firms. Sovereign risk is included as credit default swap (CDS)
spreads for a firm’s country of incorporation for the period from Q1:2001 until
Q4:2015. In total, we include almost 155,000 observations which cover both Ad-
vanced Economies and Emerging and Developing Economies permitting for a
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detailed and comprehensive analysis of additional country subgroups.
We find the total spillover effect to range between zero and minus one for the
majority of country subgroups, indicating an increase of sovereign risk of one
percent causes a reduction of capital expenditures between zero and one percent.
We further find significant differences in the share of direct and indirect spillover
channels. The channel decomposition reveals that more than 80 percent of the
reduction in capital expenditures can be attributed to second-order spillovers
from sovereign risk to firms’ capital market risk and profitability in Advanced
Economies. On the contrary, we find that almost 50 percent of these decreases
are attributable to the direct effects of increases in sovereign risk in Emerging
and Developing Economies. The other 50 percent are almost equally distributed
among firms’ capital market risk and profitability.
The results bear strong economic and policy implications. For firms in Emerg-
ing and Developing Economies, sovereign risk has an immediate negative spillover
on their investments. A possible explanation for this finding is that for this coun-
try aggregate, firms’ general business activities are closely tied to government
activities and thus sovereign risk is perceived as being corporate risk. Advanced
Economy firms, on the other hand, adapt rising sovereign risk mainly through
their capital market risk, which is most likely the case because of more developed
and efficient stock markets in these countries and greater independence of their
operational activity from the respective government. Here, cuts in investments are
likely to occur not immediately, but with a lag. Particularly, in the light of rising
sovereign risk levels, policy makers need to take into account these differences in
sovereign to corporate spillover.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the
economic foundation for studying sovereign to corporate risk spillovers and
extends the analysis by its implications to the real economy. Section 3 introduces
the basic econometric model, as well as the identified spillover channels and the
estimation approach used. After providing empirical evidence and economic
implications in Sections 4 and 5, respectively, we conclude in Section 6.
2 Economic Foundation
In the context of corporate finance, risk is usually considered as being investment-
specific and is modelled accordingly. In this paper, our approach is quite different,
as we aim to explain the general transmission mechanisms from sovereign to
corporate risk and profitability and how they affect firms’ investment activities.
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We define the various channels of risk spillovers econometrically, and relate
our empirical findings to the research that investigates sources of sovereign to
corporate risk spillover effects. Augustin et al. (2016) identify six sources1 of risk
spillovers from the sovereign to the corporates. First, the adjustment in taxation of
corporate income appears relevant. As Augustin et al. (2016) point out, an increase
in an economy’s sovereign risk might induce a rise in corporate taxes in both the
present and the future. The assumed immediate anticipation of firms can lead to
a reduction in investment activity and thus hamper future economic growth at
the macro level. Second, an increase in sovereign risk increases the likelihood of
private firms being expropriated. This is especially the case for firms in emerging
and developing countries. Third, “sovereign ceilings” may create an environment
in which corporations are unable to refinance themselves at more favourable
conditions than their respective government. Almeida et al. (2017) find sovereign
ceiling policies still being applied and that firms reduce their investments due to
rises in the cost of debt capital. They argue that “[t]he ceiling rule pushes down
ratings and may be responsible for significant effects on firm investment and
financial policy in the aftermath of a sovereign downgrade” (Almeida et al., 2017,
p. 289). Fourth, increasing sovereign risk can induce a drop in public expenditure
and thus a revenue downturn for corporates, on whose economic activities rely to
a notable extent on the public sector. This latter causal relationship is also linked
to the fifth source that we discuss. Here, an increase in sovereign risk induces a
decrease in direct financial aid from the government to the domestic corporates,
e.g., in terms of subsidies. The last source is less direct compared to the ones
mentioned before. Based on studies by Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014),
Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch (2014) and Gennaioli et al. (2012), Augustin
et al. (2016) argue that a rise in sovereign risk can affect financial institutions and
hence corporates which heavily rely on bank credit. The latter is confirmed by
Bedendo and Colla (2013) using firm-level data on corporate CDS spreads in the
euro zone.
As argued in The Economist (2016), firms recently need to pay attention to
political risk not only in the developing but also in the advanced economies. The
executives need to take this new development into account when scheduling
long-term investments and forecasting expected returns. Such sources of risk,
not mentioned above, can be either domestic, non-domestic or a mix of them.
A potential source of domestic risk is political uncertainty on business relevant
1Deviating from Augustin et al. (2016), we call them “sources” instead of “channels” in order to
distinguish them from the type of channels defined in this paper.
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topics in a firm’s country of incorporation. A topical example for this source of
risk, also mentioned in The Economist (2016), is the United Kingdom European
Union membership referendum (“Brexit referendum”), which has taken place in
June 2016. In this context, the future arrangements shaping the formal relations
between the United Kingdom and the European Union, in particular, the unlimited
access for firms to each others’ market, state a source of domestic risk. For firms
located in the United Kingdom, this political uncertainty might lead to investments
being reduced, postponed, or, in the worst case, being called off entirely. For UK-
headquartered firms, this risk is purely domestic as the relocation of a firm’s
headquarters could eliminate the risk. For firms located outside the UK, the
political uncertainty works the same way. Non-domestic sources of risk, on the
other hand, comprise all sources of risk, that are not solely linked to domestic
uncertainty. For example, a highly volatile exchange rate environment might
induce non-domestic risk for export-oriented firms, because it is likely to affect
their international sales, ceteris paribus.
To our knowledge, there is no paper that models capital expenditures as being
specifically dependent on sovereign and firms’ capital market risk and profitability
using micro panel data. While a higher firms’ profitability is assumed to positively
affect firms’ capital expenditures, a higher capital market risk is expected to
decrease their investment activity. In line with the literature mentioned above,
sovereign risk is assumed to exert substantial spillover on firms’ capital market
risk. The latter is assumed to be negatively correlated with firms’ profitability and
capital expenditures, while more profits are expected to benefit firms’ investment
activities. Changes in the sovereign risk might thus spill over to firms’ capital
expenditures directly and indirectly through firms’ characteristics.
Our contribution is twofold: First, we provide a general definition of the
transmission mechanism from sovereign risk to the real economy, i.e., firms’ in-
vestments. Second, decomposing the aggregate effect allows us to study the direct
and indirect channels of spillover separately.
3 Methodology
3.1 The Econometric Model
In order to study the dynamic behaviour of the variable series, we estimate a
trivariate panel vector-autoregressive model, as introduced in Love and Zicchino
(2006), extended by exogenous variables (PVARX). It combines the idea of mod-
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elling the endogenous variables as an autoregressive process, while at the same
time taking into account unobserved individual heterogeneity. Most of the recent
applications, making use of the PVAR, but abstain from modelling the exogenous
variables explicitly, include, i.a., macro- and microeconomic modelling (Atems and
Jones (2015), Lee and Gueye (2015) and Yuan and Chen (2015)), energy economics
(Probst and Sauter (2015) and Shahbaz et al. (2015)), industrial economics (Izumi
and Kwon (2015) and O’Toole et al. (2015)), and finance (Babalos et al. (2015),
Miyajima et al. (2015), Klein (2014) and Dreger and Reimers (2014)). An exception
is Djigbenou-Kre and Park (2016), modelling the exogenous variable explicitly in a
PVARX framework. The data generating process for such a system containing d
endogenous and e exogenous variables is stated by,
yi,t = Mci,t +
p∑
`=1
Γ`yi,t−` +
q∑
h=0
Θhxi,t−h + εi,t, i = 1, ..., N t = 1, ..., T, (1)
where yi,t denotes the level of each endogenous variable for firm i at time t and
yi,t−` and xi,t−h contain the `-th and h-th lags of the respective endogenous and
exogenous variables up to order p and q, respectively. Moreover, we include model
deterministic terms in ci,t and the respective coefficient matrix M. Γ` and Θh span
the space of the coefficients for the `-th lagged endogenous and the h-th lagged
exogenous variable series, respectively. The disturbances for each of the covariates
are captured in εi,t.
Apart from the coefficient matrices Γ` and Θh themselves, economic inference
in VARX models is commonly drawn from impulse response functions for the
endogenous variables and multiplier analysis for the exogenous variables. Fol-
lowing Lu¨tkepohl (2007), an impulse response function illustrates the impact of a
shock (“innovation”) on a variable itself and on other variables in the system over
time. In both cases, we apply a one-standard deviation shock in order to study
the responses consistently. The impulse response function from an endogenous
variable k on another endogenous variable j at point r is calculated according to
the formula presented in equation (2),
φjk,1 = γjk,1 and φjk,r = γjk,r +
r−1∑
`=1
γjk,`ηr−` for r > 1, (2)
where γjk,` represents the element in the j-th row and k-th column of the `-th
lag matrix and η is defined as [det(γ(L))]−1. From this, accumulative impulse
responses (Ψs) until point s as well as the total responses (Ψ∞) can be directly
6
calculated by,
Ψs =
s∑
r=0
Φr and Ψ∞ =
∞∑
r=0
Φr, (3)
where responses to an innovation in the k-th variable are contained in the k-th
column of the respective Ψ matrix.
In order to study the effect an innovation in an exogenous variable has on
endogenous variables, we follow Lu¨tkepohl (2007) and use dynamic multiplier
analysis. Dynamic multipliers, D, can be recovered from the Γ and Θ matrices
from equation (1) using,
D(L) =
∞∑
r=0
DrL
r = Γ(L)−1Θ(L), (4)
with Γ(L) and Θ(L) defined as Γ(L) = Id − Γ1L − · · · − ΓpLp and Θ(L) = Θ0 +
Θ1L+ · · ·+ΘqLq representing the reduced-form operators. We obtain the marginal
change (dynamic multiplier, δkj,r) in an endogenous variable k in period t+ r after
an innovation in the exogenous variable j in period t, holding the system constant.
From this dynamic multiplier, the accumulative effect (interim multiplier, Is) up to
period s and the long-term impact (total multiplier, T∞) can be calculated by,
Is =
s∑
r=0
Dr and T∞ =
∞∑
r=0
Dr. (5)
3.2 Identification of Spillover Channels
In contrast to vector autoregressive systems without explicitly modelled exogenous
variables, PVARX models allow for an in-depth analysis of how innovations
in an exogenous variable affect an endogenous variable directly and indirectly
through responses in other endogenous variables. We define the total multiplier
effect as formulated in equation (5), which contains the aggregate effects from an
innovation in the exogenous variable, as the total spillover channel (TSC). Based
on this, we identify two subchannels of spillover effects. They are obtained by
the decomposition of the total multiplier into a direct spillover channel (DSC)
and an aggregate indirect spillover channel (AISC), which are contained in the
matrices Γ(L) and Θ(L), respectively. For this, we state the matrices Γ(L) and
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Θ(L) explicitly by,
Γ(L) =

γ˜mm . . . γ˜md
... . . .
...
γ˜dm . . . γ˜dd
 and Θ(L) =

θ˜mmk . . . θ˜mme
... . . .
...
θ˜dmk . . . θ˜dme
 . (6)
This decomposition allows us to make a detailed examination of how shocks in
the exogenous variables are incorporated in the system of endogenous variables.
From equation 6, the total spillover channel (TSC) from an innovation in the k-th
exogenous variable on the m-th endogenous variable is defined by,
TSCmk =
d∑
j=1
γ˜mj · θ˜jmk. (7)
The direct and aggregate indirect spillover channels (DSC and AISC) are
available from the decomposition shown in equation (8). For the convenience of
comparability across models, we define them as a share of the TSC.2
DSCmk =
γ˜mm · θ˜mmk
TSCmk
and AISCmk =
∑
j 6=m γ˜jm · θ˜jmk
TSCmk
. (8)
From AISC, further decomposition leads to the individual indirect spillover
channel (IISC) through the endogenous variable j:
IISCmjk =
γ˜mj · θ˜jmk
TSCmk
, j 6= m. (9)
The spillover contained in IISCmjk is thus the fraction of a shock in the exoge-
nous variable k transmitted to the endogenous variable m via another endogenous
variable j.
3.3 The Estimation Approach
Following Lu¨tkepohl (2010), the estimation of VAR processes is usually done by
traditional approaches such as least squares, maximum likelihood or Bayesian
methods. While these methods are considered to provide a sound framework for
parameter estimation, the optimal estimation for a specific application is often
distorted by technical difficulties. The main issue in VAR processes lies in the trade-
2Note that the representation as a fraction of the TSC requires the same sign of γ˜mj · θ˜mk for
each j when m and k held fixed.
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off between model fit and over-parametrisation. Here, numerous issues arise when
seasonalities, long memory or delayed reactions need to be taken into account. In
traditional VAR estimation approaches, where generally all parameters up to a
predefined lag length p are estimated, the number of degrees of freedom decreases
sharply. This is especially severe in panel models which typically have limited
observations across time. Moreover, usually not all the estimated parameters
have the same explanatory performance for the process. It is therefore highly
appealing to include only those parameters which have high levels of significance
and ignoring all the others. This subset selection problem can approached by
fitting the model that minimizes the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC),
BIC = ln
(∣∣∣Ωˆε∣∣∣)+ α · ln(T )
T
, (10)
where Ωˆε = T−1
∑T
t=1 εˆtεˆt
′ denotes the residual variance-covariance matrix from
the estimated VAR model without correcting for the degrees of freedom. In the
second term in the BIC, α = #{M,Γ,Θ} is the number of non-zero parameters
included in the model. α · ln(T )/T facilitates model validation and subset selection:
Parameters should only be included if they reduce the in-sample error by more
than their potential contribution to over-fitting. Finding the model with the lowest
BIC is therefore equivalent with choosing the model with the highest posterior
probability (cf., Hastie et al. (2009, section 7.7) and Zivot and Wang (2006)).
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Data and Model Specification
In order to capture the response that a shock on one variable has on another as pre-
cisely as possible, we collect firm-level quarterly data on capital expenditures (κt)
in millions of US dollars, the capital market risk calculated as the annualised
standard deviation of daily stock returns during a quarter (σt), and the return
on capital (ρt) defined as 0.625 times the EBIT divided by the average of the cur-
rent and the previous quarter’s total capital value in percent3 for manufacturing
firms4 for the period from Q1:2001 to Q4:2015 are drawn from the S&P Capital IQ
database.
3We find average corporate tax rates similar in Advanced Economies and Emerging and
Developing Economies, on average. The total capital is calculated as the sum of preferred and
common equity and the total debt of a firm.
4Firms with SIC codes 20–39.
9
Table 1: Data descriptive statistics
Variable descriptive statistics:
Mean SD Q0.25 Median Q0.75
Capital expenditures (in 1,000 USD) 63,091 414,677 435.79 2,598 16,866
Annualised stock return volatility 0.49 0.52 0.27 0.38 0.55
Return on capital (in %) 5.59 13.39 1.32 5.48 10.46
Sovereign CDS spread (in basis points) 152.45 437.67 25.66 69.94 140.38
Sample composition:
No. of Share of No. of Share of
obs. obs. firms firms
Advanced Economies (AE) 85,206 0.55 3,264 0.56
Major Advanced Economies (MAE) 36,932 0.24 1,139 0.19
Other Advanced Economies (OAE) 48,274 0.31 2,125 0.36
Euro Area (EA)1 25,694 0.17 844 0.14
Emerging and Developing Economies (EE) 69,649 0.45 2,608 0.44
Emerging and Developing Europe (EME) 9,563 0.06 414 0.07
Emerging and Developing Asia (EMA) 38,059 0.25 1,244 0.21
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 8,736 0.06 288 0.05
Oth. Emerging and Developing Economies (EMO) 13,291 0.09 662 0.11
Total 154,855 1.00 5,872 1.00
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of the variables in levels (upper panel) and information on the sample compo-
sition (lower panel). 1 Euro Area countries are contained in Major and Other Advanced Economies.
While the return on capital serves as an indicator for the general success of the
firm, i.e., its profitability, the capital market risk is used as a proxy for the ease of
refinancing investments. Moreover, we obtain data on sovereign credit default
swap (CDS) spreads for the country of incorporation from Markit database. In line
with Gyntelberg et al. (2013), we choose 5-year maturity CDS contracts as they
state a more liquid market, in terms of quotes, compared to the 10-year maturity
CDS contracts market. The credit event considered is a full restructuring of the
underlying sovereign. For non-US firms, all CDS spreads are denominated in USD.
For US firms, on the other hand, CDS spreads are denominated in euro to remove
imprecisions from currency risks. All capital expenditure series are calculated as
real values using the US GDP deflator from the IMF World Economic Outlook
database.
Table 1 illustrates some data descriptive statistics. The median of quarterly
capital expenditures is approximately 2.6 million US dollar, with a relatively broad
range as indicated by the 0.25 and 0.75 percentiles. Considering the latter, the
annualised stock return volatility – used as a measure for firms’ capital market
risk ranges between 0.27 and 0.55 with a mean of 0.49. For the return on capital,
we find the mean (median) at 5.6 (5.5) percent. Sovereign risk, as measured by
the respective CDS spread in basis points, has a mean of 152.5 with the lowest
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(highest) quantile below (above) 25.7 (140.4). When it comes to estimation, all
series are log-transformed.5
The dataset spans across more than 5,800 firms with approximately 155,000 ob-
servations located in Advanced Economies or Emerging and Developing Economies.
For reasons of comparability, we rely on the country aggregation proposed by the
International Monetary Fund (cf., International Monetary Fund (2015)) and define
Advanced Economies (AE) and Emerging and Developing Economies (EE) as well
as their subcategories of Major Advanced Economies (MAE), Other Advanced
Economies (OAE), the Euro Area (EA), Emerging and Developing Europe (EME),
Emerging and Developing Asia (EMA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC),
and Other Emerging and Developing Economies (EMO).6
In order to prevent biased results and inference drawn from the estimated
coefficients, all series contained in the vector autoregression must be stationary.
We apply the augmented version of the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root
test introduced in Pesaran (2007), which belongs to the second generation unit-
root tests as it exhibits robustness towards cross-sectional dependence. The null
hypothesis of a unit root in the series can be tested against various alternatives.
For the exogenous variable, the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test
introduced in Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), is used. The null hypothesis of the test
states level-stationarity of a series.7 The results of the two tests, displayed in the
Tables 9 and 8 in Appendix C, respectively, indicate that all panel variables are
tested stationary, and hence taken in their level values. Most sovereign CDS spread
series, on the other hand, are non-stationary, and hence – for consistency – all CDS
spread series are taken in their stationary first differences. For the latter, especially
for small countries with only a few large firms, endogeneity arising from reverse
causality between firms’ capital market risk and sovereign risk might be an issue.
Hence, we apply the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test considering any country aggregate
used in the empirical analysis. Here, under the null hypothesis the suspected
endogenous variable can be considered exogenous. As Table 7 in Appendix C
shows, endogeneity is not present in any subsample.
Furthermore, when it comes to empirical application, we follow Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Love and Zicchino (2006) and transform the data using the
“Helmert procedure” to control for individual fixed effects.8 In order to make the
5Descriptive statistics for the log-transformed variables and by region can be found in Tables 5
and 6 in Appendix A, respectively.
6Other Emerging and Developing Economies (EMO) are defined as the residual of EE not
elsewhere classified.
7For more details, please refer to Pesaran (2007) and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992).
8“This procedure removes only the forward mean, i.e. the mean of all the future observations
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dataset as representative as possible, we use an individual weighting approach
within each of the country aggregates. Each observation is weighted by the
share of the country’s GDP in the respective aggregate adjusted by the share of
observations per country in the sample. For this, we collect annual data on the
real GDP from the IMF World Economic Outlook for each country included.9
4.2 Model Fitting Procedure
Minimizing the BIC in equation (10) requires choosing the subset of included
parameters and finding their optimal values. The resulting minimization problem
is neither convex nor continuous, traditional deterministic methods therefore fail.
Exhaustive search for the subset selection is also not possible due to the large
number of alternatives10, nor is manual selection in the absence of an efficient and
reliable rule. In this paper, we follow the approach suggested by Maringer and
Deininger (2016) who adapt Differential Evolution11 (DE) for the selection and
estimation of VAR models. There, the selection process is combined with estimat-
ing the included parameters’ values. Specifically, the method primarily finds the
parameter values, but values that are sufficiently close to zero (here: an absolute
value of less than 0.001) are excluded from the model. DE is an Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC)-type search process incorporating evolutionary principles
and exhibits favourable convergence properties for challenging optimization prob-
lems like the one in this paper. The reported results are based on 100 restarts for
each model, all implementations where done with R, version 3.2.3.
4.3 Estimation Results
In this section, we discuss the estimation results from the trivariate PVARX model.
Economic inference is drawn from estimated parameters as well as impulse re-
sponse functions, interim multipliers and total multipliers. For reasons of clarity
and comprehensibility, we focus on the results for the aggregates of Advanced
Economies (AE) and Emerging and Developing Economies (EE).12
The parameter estimates for the models of country aggregates, allowing for a
maximum of four lags in both endogenous and exogenous variables, are depicted
in Table 2. Here, blank fields indicate that these parameters add no substantial
available for each firm-year.” (Love and Zicchino, 2006, p. 195)
9A detailed description of the weighting approach is provided in Appendix B.
10With 63 parameters to choose from, there are 263 = 9.2× 1018 combinations.
11cf., Storn and Price (1997) and Price et al. (2005).
12The model estimates for the subgroups can be found in the Tables 10 to 12 in Appendix D.
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Table 2: Parameter estimates by main country aggregate
Advanced Economies Emerging and Developing Economies
κt σt ρt κt σt ρt
Q1 −0.130
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.024
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.210
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.001)
∗∗∗
Q2 0.006
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.003)
∗∗∗
Q3 0.027
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.002)
∗∗∗
Q4 0.149
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.220
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.001)
∗∗∗
κt−1 0.399
(0.011)
∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.312
(0.010)
∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.023)
∗∗∗
κt−2 0.113
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.133
(0.010)
∗∗∗
κt−3 0.038
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.009)
∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.007)
∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.003)
∗∗∗
κt−4 0.128
(0.009)
∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.005)
∗∗∗ 0.108
(0.008)
∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.017)
∗∗∗
σt−1 −0.066
(0.011)
∗∗∗ 0.318
(0.010)
∗∗∗ −0.076
(0.019)
∗∗∗ 0.282
(0.024)
∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.024)
∗∗∗
σt−2 −0.036
(0.013)
∗∗∗ 0.102
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.106
(0.021)
∗∗∗
σt−3 −0.041
(0.011)
∗∗∗ 0.094
(0.005)
∗∗∗ 0.071
(0.007)
∗∗∗
σt−4 0.018
(0.007)
∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.021)
∗∗∗
ρt−1 0.253
(0.053)
∗∗∗ −0.082
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.322
(0.020)
∗∗∗ 0.396
(0.077)
∗∗∗ −0.084
(0.025)
∗∗∗ 0.180
(0.037)
∗∗∗
ρt−2 0.151
(0.052)
∗∗∗ 0.086
(0.017)
∗∗∗ 0.355
(0.079)
∗∗∗ 0.070
(0.035)
∗∗∗
ρt−3 0.236
(0.094)
∗∗∗ 0.074
(0.032)
∗∗∗
ρt−4 0.052
(0.042)
∗∗∗ −0.049
(0.019)
∗∗∗ 0.141
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.120
(0.083)
∗∗∗ 0.168
(0.015)
∗∗∗
ζt−0 0.318
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.335
(0.016)
∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.004)
∗∗∗
ζt−1 0.107
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.004)
∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.004)
∗∗∗
ζt−2 0.103
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.045)
∗∗∗ −0.057
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.079
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.029)
∗∗∗
ζt−3 0.065
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.088
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.025)
∗∗∗
ζt−4 −0.047
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.031
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.027)
∗∗∗ −0.088
(0.001)
∗∗∗
Notes: κt = capital expenditures, σt = stock return volatility, ρt = return on capital and ζt = sovereign CDS.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Blank fields indicate that these parameters can be excluded from the model without loss of information
in the sense of the BIC.
information and should therefore be excluded: in the sense of the BIC, any addi-
tional parameter must (marginally) improve the model fit by more than its cost
due to potential over-fitting, which is only the case for reported parameters. In
all models, we detect significant seasonal effects with capital expenditures being
lowest in the first and highest in the fourth calendar quarter. Although seasonal
effects are of minor importance for firms’ capital market risk, we detect significant
differences between quarters for the return on capital, especially in the case of EE.
13
We observe a long memory for capital expenditures, firms’ capital market risk
and profitability in both country aggregates. An inspection of the cross-variable
impact reveals significant negative effects from a firm’s capital market risk on its
capital expenditures. While this effect is persistent for three quarters in the case
of AE, we observe no negative spillover effects for EE after the first quarter. For
the latter, profitability seems to be of comparatively greater significance for capital
expenditures in both persistence and magnitude. No significant influences from
capital expenditures on either firms’ capital market risk or their profitability is
found. An increase in profitability leads to a decline in the firms’ capital market
risk. However, a transmission effect in the opposite direction of changing capital
market risk leading to an adjustment in firms’ profitability cannot be confirmed.
Figure 1: Accumulative impulse response functions from system variable shocks
on capital expenditures
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ex enditures i both persistence and magnitude. While w do not find significant influence
from capital expenditures on either firms’ capital market risk or their profitability, an increase
in the latter leads to a decline in the firms’ capital market risk. However, a transmission effect
in the opposite direction of lower capital market risk leading to a higher profitability cannot be
confirmed.
Figure II.1: Accumulative impulse response functions from system variable shocks on firms’
capital expenditures
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Notes: The figures show accumulative impulse response functions; i.e., the cumulative response of one variable at time t + i after a
one-standard deviation shock on itself or another variable at time t .
These findings are validated by accumulative impulse responses illustrated in Figure II.1.10 It
can be seen that at a 10 percent level of significance, represented by the pale-shaded confidence
interval11, for the aggregate of AE , an innovation in firms’ capital market risk has a negative
impact on their capital expenditures for more than twelve quarters. The magnitude of the effect
of −0.26 indicates that an increase in firms’ capital market risk of ten percent is associated with a
decrease of 2.6 percent in their capital expenditures.
For the group of EE , the negative influence of approximately 0.15 percent is offset twelve
quarters after the innovation. When considering, instead, an innovation in the firms’ profitability,
we find significant positive responses for both country groups. Specifically, an innovation in
firms’ profitability results in a rise of 0.28 and 0.39 percent in Advanced Economies and Emerging
and Developing Economies, respectively.
10The magnitude is scaled by the respective sample standard deviation such that, in the case of log series, an innovation
represents a one percent change causing a percentage response.
11The confidence intervals are calculated from 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations.
Notes: κt = capital expenditures, σt = stock return volatility and ρt = return on capital. The figures show accumulative
orthogonalised impulse response functions, i.e., the cumulative response of one variable at time t+ r after a one-standard
deviation shock on itself or another variable at time t.
These findings are validated by accumulative impulse responses illustrated
in Figure 1.13 It can be seen that at a 10 percent level of significance, represented
13The magnitude is scaled by the respective sample standard deviation such that, in the case of
log series, an innovation represents a one percent chang causing a percent response.
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by the pale-shaded confidence interval14, for the aggregate of AE, an innovation
in a firm’s capital market risk has a significant negative impact on its capital
expenditures for more than twelve quarters. The magnitude of the effect of
−0.26 indicates that an increase in the firm’s capital market risk of one percent is
associated with a decrease of 0.26 percent in its capital expenditures.
For the group of EE, the negative influence of approximately 0.15 percent
is offset twelve quarters after the innovation at least at the 10 percent level of
significance. When considering instead an innovation in the firms’ profitability,
we find significant positive responses for both country groups. An innovation in
the profitability results in a rise of 0.28 and 0.39 percent in Advanced Economies
and Emerging and Developing Economies, respectively.
For the case of sovereign risk as an exogenous variable, when restricting our
analysis on parameter estimates, we observe no immediate effect on capital ex-
penditures for either AE or EE. For the latter, a negative impact from rising
sovereign risk can be detected after two quarters, and after additional two quar-
ters in AE. While we find some influence from sovereign risk on the profitability,
the main spillover is detected in the firms’ capital market risk. For both Ad-
vanced Economies and Emerging and Developing Economies, we find significant
persistent and high magnitude risk spillover effects.
Having studied the parameter estimates in an isolated manner, the examina-
tion of interrelationships between exogenous and endogenous variables can be
conducted by using multiplier analysis as introduced in Section 3. This allows
us to examine the channels of an innovation in sovereign risk through the inter-
relationships among the endogenous variables. Figure 2 illustrates the interim
multipliers from an innovation in sovereign risk on the firms’ capital expenditures
(left panel) and on their capital market risk (right panel) for Advanced Economies
(upper) and Emerging and Developing Economies (lower).15 In opposition to
the inferences drawn from the estimated parameter values, we find significant
negative effects for both country aggregates one period after the shock. This is due
to the fact that not only direct effects but also indirect second-order effects through
other endogenous variables – in particular via the firms’ capital market risk – are
incorporated in these estimations. For both country groups, we find that a one
percent innovation in sovereign risk causes an accumulated decrease in capital
expenditures between 0.6 and 0.7 percent after 12 quarters. The effects on the firms’
capital market risk reveal a clear overshooting for the group of AEs and a nearly
14The confidence intervals are calculated from 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations.
15Being of minor significance for the two main aggregates, a graphical illustration for the firms’
profitability can be found in Figure 3 in Appendix D.
15
Figure 2: Interim multipliers from an innovation in sovereign risk on firms’ capital
expenditures (left) and capital market risk (right)
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Figure II.2: Interim multipliers from an innovation in sovereign risk on firms’ capital expenditures
(left) and capital market risk (right)
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Notes: The figures show interim multiplier functions; i.e., the cumulative response of one endogenous variable at time t + i after a
one-standard deviation shock on an exogenous variable at time t .
For the case of sovereign risk as an exogenous variable, when restricting our analysis on the
estimated coefficients, we observe no immediate effect on capital expenditures for either AE or
EE (c.f., Table II.3). For the latter, a negative impact from rising sovereign risk can be detected
after two quarters, and after two additional quarters for AE . While we find some influence
from sovereign risk on firms’ profitability, the main spillover is detected in the firms’ capital
market risk. For both Advanced Economies and Emerging and Developing Economies, we find
significant persistent and high-magnitude risk spillover effects.
Having studied the coefficient estimates in an isolated manner, the examination of interrela-
tionships between exogenous and endogenous variables can be conducted by using multiplier
analysis as introduced in Section II.2. This allows us to examine the channels of an innovation
in sovereign risk through the interrelationships among the endogenous variables. Figure II.2
illustrates the interim multiplier functions from an innovation in sovereign risk on the firms’
capital expenditures (left panel) and on their capital market risk (right panel) for Advanced
Economies (upper) and Emerging and Developing Economies (lower).12 In contrast to the in-
ferences drawn from the estimated coefficient values, we find significantly negative immediate
effects for both country aggregates. This is due to the fact that not only direct effects but also
indirect second-order effects through other endogenous variables – in particular via firms’ capital
market risk – are incorporated in these estimations. For both country groups, we find that a 1
12Being of minor significance for the two main aggregates, a graphical illustration for the profitability can be found in
Figure II.D.1 in Appendix II.D.
Note : κt = capital expenditures, σt = stock eturn volatility and ζt = sovereign CDS spread. The figures show interim
multiplier functions, i.e., the cumulative response of one endogenous variable at time t+ r after a one-standard deviation
shock on an exogenous variable at time t.
one-to-one relationship for EEs. For the former, this implies that a one percent
change in sovereign risk leads to a disproportional cumulative spillover effect
on the firms’ capital market risk of approximately 1.3 percent after 12 quarters.
Considering both the direct and indirect effect to ether leads to the t tal pillover
channel (TSC).
The TSC is illustrated in the left panel of Table 3, which also contains the
subgroups of AE and EE and 90 percent Monte Carlo-simulated confidence
bands. We observe significant values between zero and minus one for MAE,
OAE, EA, EME and EMA as well as their respective main groups AE and EE.
An ncrease in sovereign risk of e pe ent, eads thu to a long-term re uction
of capital expenditures between zero and one percent. While we find a significant
TSC value below minus one for the group of LAC, no significance is attained
for the residual group of EMO. Hence, at least for the two main aggregates,
no significant differences on long-ter spillovers from sovereign risk on capital
16
Table 3: The total spillover channel (TSC) from an innovation in sovereign risk on
firms’ capital expenditures by country aggregate
TSC LCL UCL
Advanced Economies (AE) 0.82 1.01 0.63
Major advanced (MAE) 0.99 1.26 0.72
Other advanced (OAE) 0.58 0.81 0.40
Euro area (EA) 0.72 1.18 0.34
Emerging Economies (EE) 0.81 1.29 0.42
Emerging Europe (EME) 0.52 0.96 0.18
Emerging Asia (EMA) 0.63 1.04 0.30
Latin America (LAC) 1.23 2.47 0.50
Other emerging (EMO) 0.56 2.91 1.45
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percent innovation in sovereign risk causes an accumulated decrease in capital expenditures
between 0.6 and 0.7 percent after 12 quarters. The effects on firms’ capital market risk reveal a
clear overshooting for the group of AEs and a nearly one-to-one relationship for EEs. For the
former, this implies that a shock in sovereign risk leads to a disproportional spillover effect on
firms’ capital market risk. The sum of the direct and indirect effects gives the total spillover
channel (TSC ).
Table II.4: he total spillover channel (TSC ) from an innovation in sovereign risk on firms’ capital
expenditures by country agg gate
TSC LCL UCL
Advance cono ies (AE) 0.82 1.01 0.63
ajor a a ce ( E) 0.99 1.26 0.72
ther a ( E) 0.58 0.81 0.40
Euro area ( A) 0.72 1.18 0.34
E erging c E) 0.81 1.29 0.42
E ergi E) 0.52 0.96 0.18
E ergi i A) 0.63 1.04 0.30
Latin ri C ) 1.23 2.47 0.50
ther e r i O) 0.56 2.91 1.45
10−1−2
Notes: LCL and UCL denote the lower and upper 10 percent confidence limit of the TSC estimate, respectively. The figure
shows 90 percent confidence intervals from 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations for the respective parameter estimate.
The latter is illustrated in the right-hand side panel of Table II.4, which also contains the
subgroups of AE and EE and the 90 percent Monte Carlo simulated confidence interval. We
observe significant values between 0 and −1 for MAE , OAE , EA, EME and EMA as well as their
respective main groups AE and EE . While we find a significant TSC value below minus one for
the group of LAC13, no significance is attained for the residual group of EMO. Hence, at least for
the two main aggregates, no significant differences on long-term spillovers from sovereign risk
on capital expenditures can be detected. We find, however, significant differences within each
main aggregate. For example, within AE , we find the TSC to be highest in MAE with −0.99 and
lowest for OAE with −0.58.
Having inspected the total effect, another interesting question concerns the size of each
subchannel’s percentage share in the total spillover channel (TSC ). For this, we decompose the
latter into its components of DSC and AISC with its individual subcomponents I ISC as defined
in Section II.2.2.
Referring to Table II.5, we find significant differences in the composition of the TSC . For
the main group of Advanced Economies, more than 70 percent of the reduction in capital
expenditures after an innovation in sovereign risk is attributable to the indirect channel via
the firms’ capital market risk (I ISCκσζ). The remainder of the indirect channel (approximately
10 percent) is caused by firms’ profitability (I ISCκρζ). For this country aggregate, the direct
channel is of minor importance and accounts for only 18 percent. For Emerging and Developing
Economies, on the contrary, the direct channel accounts for almost 50 percent of the reduction
in capital expenditures. As can be inferred from their respective shares of 28 and 24 percent,
firms’ capital market risk is of less significance while the portion of profitability is closer to that
of AEs. However, it is worth emphasizing that the estimated shares for the subgroups of MAE ,
OEA and EA are of similar size, while the composition within the various subgroups of EE is
13A possible explanation for this result is the large volatility of Latin American sovereign CDS during the analysed
sample period.
Notes: LCL and UCL denote the lower and u per 10 perc t confidenc limit of the TSC estimate, respec-
tively. The figure shows 90 percent confidence intervals from 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations for the respec-
tive parameter estimate.
expenditures c be detec ed.16
Having inspected the total effect, another interesting question concerns the
size of each subchannel’s percentage share in the total spillover channel (TSC).
For this, we decompose the latter into its components of DSC and AISC with its
individual subcomponents IICS.
Referring to Table 4, e find significant differences in the composition of
the TSC. For e main group of Advanced Economies, more than 70 percent
of the reduction in capit l xpenditures after a innovation in sovereign risk is
attributable to the indirect channel via the firms’ capital market risk (IISCκσζ).
The remainder of the indirect channel (approximately 10 percent) is caused by the
Table 4: Decomposition of the TSC into subchannels (in percent) by country
aggregate
DSCκζ
Indirect channels
AISCκζ IISCκσζ IISCκρζ
Advanced Economies (AE) 17.69 82.31 72.06 10.24
Major advanced (MAE) 19.28 80.72 71.03 9.70
Other adva ced (OAE) 20.87 79.13 69.76 9.36
Euro area (EA) 15.15 84.85 64.49 20.37
Emerging Economies (EE) 48.36 51.64 27.92 23.72
Emerging Europe (EME) 59.01 40.99 25.51 15.47
Emerging Asia (EMA) 24.11 75.89 32.22 43.68
Latin America (LAC) 68.96 31.04 31.04 0.00
Other emerging (EMO) 67.03 32.97 18.45 14.52
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more heterogeneous. In particular, this becomes visible when comparing LAC and EMO with
EMA. While for the first two groups the direct channel accounts for almost 70 percent of the
total spillover from sovereign risk t capital expenditur s, only 24 percent can be explained
by this effect in the subgroup of EMA. Instead, spillo er effects operate mainly through the
indirect channel with profitability and firms’ capital market risk accounting for 44 and 32 percent,
respectively.
Table II.5: Decomposition of the TSC into subchannels (in percent) by country aggregate
DSCκζ
Indirect channels
AISCκζ I ISCκσζ I ISCκρζ
Advanced Ec nomies (AE) 17.69 82.31 72.06 10.24
Major advanced (MAE) 19.28 80.72 71.03 9.70
Other advanced (OAE) 20.87 79.13 69.76 9.36
Euro rea (EA) 1 .15 84.85 64.49 20.37
Emer ing Ec nomies (EE) 48.36 51.64 27.92 23.72
Emer ing Europe (EME) 59.01 40.99 25.51 15.47
Emer ing Asia (EMA) 24.11 75.89 3 .22 43.68
Latin America (LAC ) 68.96 31.04 31.04 .00
Other mer ing (EMO) 67.03 32.97 18.45 14.52
0 20 40 60 80 100
DSCκζ I ISCκσζ I ISCκρζ
Notes: The direct channel (DSC ) contains all non-second order effects from an increase in sovereign risk on firms’ capital expendi-
tures. The indirect spillover channels contain all second-order effects from an increase in sovereign risk on firms’ capital expenditures
through firms’ capital market risk (I ISCκσζ) and profitability (I ISCκρζ). Together, the latter two form the aggregate indirect spillover
channel (AISCκζ).
There are at least two potential explanations for the significantly different statistical results
regarding the effects of risk spillover channels between Advanced Economies and Emerging and
Developing Economies. While for the EE an innovation in sovereign risk leads to a long-term
spillover of approximately one, we detect overshooting for the group of AE . In combination with
a stronger link between firms’ capital market risk and capital expenditures, this indirect channel
becomes comparatively more important for the latter group. At the same time, the direct effect
from a shock on the sovereign CDS on capital expenditures is weak for Advanced Economies
and strong for Emerging and Developing Economies.
The results support the theoretical hypothesis that different institutional frameworks in Ad-
vanced Economies and in Developing and Emerging Economies substantially influence their
firms’ investment behaviour. While firms domiciled in advanced countries absorb shocks to
sovereign risk mainly through their individual firm risk, systemic risk seems more important in
developing countries. These differences could at least partly be explained by institutional differ-
ences between the two country groups. Indeed, a lack of institutional security in combination
with a strong connection between the government and the domestic corporates can rationalize
the pronounced direct spillover in Emerging and Developing Economies.
In this context, it is also worth mentioning that the sources of risk spillovers from the sovereign
to the corporates are indeed manifold. According to Augustin et al. (2016), there are six sources
of spillovers which have different relevance across countries. While an increase in corporate
taxes, “sovereign ceilings”, a decrease in public expenditures and reduced financial aid, e.g., in
the form of subsidies, are likely to have negative impacts on both Advanced Economies and
Emerging and Developing Economies, other sources of spillovers might be particularly relevant
for some country aggregates. To give an example, an increase in the likelihood of private firms
being expropriated by a regime, which is induced by a rise in sovereign risk, can be envisaged
for some Emerging and Developing Economies, while such a scenario would seem unlikely for
Notes: The direct channel ( SC) contains all non-second order effects from an increase in sovereign risk on firms’ capital
expenditures. The indirect spillover channels contain all second-order effects from an increase in sovereign risk on firms’
capital expenditures through firms’ capital market risk (IISCκσζ ) and profitability (IISCκρζ ). Together, the latter two
form the aggregate indirect spillover channel (AISCκζ ).
firms’ profitability (IISCκρζ). For this country aggregate, the direct channel is of
16There exist, howev r, significant differences within each main aggregate. For example, within
AE, we find the TSC to be highest in MAE with −0.99 and lowest for OAE with −0.58.
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minor importance and accounts for only 18 percent. For Emerging and Developing
Economies, on the contrary, the direct channel accounts for almost 50 percent of the
reduction in capital expenditures. As can be inferred from their respective shares of
28 and 24 percent, firms’ capital market risk is of less significance while the portion
of profitability is comparable to that ofAEs. However, it is worth emphasizing that
the estimated shares for the subgroups of MAE, OEA and EA are of similar size,
while the composition within the various subgroups of EE is more heterogeneous.
In particular, this becomes visible when comparing LAC and EMO with EMA.
While for the first two groups the direct channel accounts for almost 70 percent of
the total spillover from sovereign risk to capital expenditures, only 25 percent can
be explained by this effect in the group EMA. Instead, spillover effects operate
mainly through the indirect channel with return on capital and firms’ capital
market risk accounting for 44 and 32 percent, respectively.
5 Economic Explanation and Policy Implications
There are at least two potential more technical explanations for substantially
different risk spillover channels between Advanced Economies and Emerging and
Developing Economies. While for the EE an innovation in sovereign risk leads to
a long-term spillover of approximately one, we detect overshooting for the group
of AE. In combination with a stronger link between firms’ capital market risk and
capital expenditures, this indirect channel becomes comparatively more important
for firms located in AEs. At the same time, the direct effect from a shock on the
sovereign CDS spread on capital expenditures is weak for Advanced Economies
and strong for Emerging and Developing Economies.
In an institutional context, it is also worth mentioning that the sources of risk
spillovers from the sovereign to the corporates are indeed manifold. According
to Augustin et al. (2016), there are six sources of spillovers which have different
relevance across countries. While an increase in corporate taxes, “sovereign
ceilings”, a decrease in public expenditures and reduced financial aid, e.g., in
the form of subsidies, are likely to have negative impacts on both Advanced
Economies and Emerging and Developing Economies, other sources of spillovers
might be particularly relevant for some country aggregates. To give an example, an
increase in the likelihood of private firms being expropriated by a regime, which
is induced by a rise in sovereign risk, can be envisaged for some Emerging and
Developing Economies, while such a scenario would seem unlikely for Advanced
Economies, considering our set of non-financial firms. Bank credits, on the other
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hand, are shown to be a possible source of risk for corporates which rely on them
excessively. The latter concept is based on work from Acharya, Drechsler, and
Schnabl (2014), Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch (2014) and Gennaioli et al.
(2012) and confirmed by Bedendo and Colla (2013) for corporates in the euro zone
using firm-level data on CDS spreads. Furthermore, one might think of further
sources of risk, which can be categorized into domestic and non-domestic sources
of risk. An example for domestic risk could be political uncertainty on topics of
high business relevance. A volatile exchange rate, on the other hand, might serve
as a source for non-domestic risk.
The results support the theoretical hypothesis that different institutional frame-
works in Advanced Economies and in Developing and Emerging Economies
substantially influence their firms’ investment behaviour. While firms domiciled
in advanced countries absorb shocks to sovereign risk mainly through their in-
dividual firm risk, systemic risk seems more important in developing countries.
These differences could at least partly be explained by institutional differences
between the two country groups. Indeed, a lack of institutional security in com-
bination with a strong connection between the government and the domestic
corporates can rationalize the pronounced direct spillover in Emerging and Devel-
oping Economies. For Advanced Economies, on the other hand, given that our
measure for a firm’s capital market risk is proxied by its stock return volatility,
the highly developed stock markets in this group of countries could serve as
an explanation for a strong indirect channel. Furthermore, greater operational
independence from the government in Advanced Economy firms can rationalize
why spillover occurs with a lag through market mechanisms. Here, a strong
spillover from sovereign to firms’ capital market risk, and actual overshooting,
in the first step followed by firms’ reaction in carrying on investments leads to
different importance of the direct and indirect channels.
We also find a different transmission mechanism for firms domiciled in emerg-
ing Asian countries compared to those located in other emerging markets. A
possible explanation for this finding is that firms in emerging Asia are usually
highly export-oriented, making non-domestic sources of risk, e.g., the global
business cycle or exchange rate effects more relevant.
As a current example, illustrating the economic foundation above, consider the
United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (“Brexit referendum”).
Even though the evolved political uncertainty applies for both firms in the UK
and for those located in other EU countries, it states a domestic source of risk. As
argued above, firms in Advanced Economies adapt an increasing sovereign risk
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mainly through their capital market risk, and hence, the aftermaths on the firms’
long-term investments are likely to occur with a lag. Nonetheless, to get a clear
evidence on this, further research is needed.
6 Conclusion
This paper uses a panel vector autoregressive model extended by exogenous
variables (PVARX) to describe the various effects that an increase in sovereign risk
has on firms’ investment activities. For this, we collect quarterly data on capital
expenditures, stock return volatility and return on capital for more than 5,800
firms in the manufacturing sector of both Advanced Economies and Emerging
and Developing Economies. Moreover, we obtain sovereign CDS spreads as an
exogenous variable for the countries included for the period of Q1:2001 until
Q4:2015.
We find the total effect of increased sovereign risk on firms’ capital expenditures
to have a moderate effect between 0 and −1 percent for most country aggregates.
A decomposition the total elasticity into a direct and an indirect channel, however,
reveals substantial differences across regions. For firms in Emerging and Develop-
ing Economies the “direct channel” from increased sovereign risk on their capital
expenditures is of major importance. Firms located in an Advanced Economy,
on the other hand, adopt increasing levels of sovereign risk mainly through their
own capital market risk. For this group of firms, declines in investments occur
predominantly through an “indirect channel”.
The results bear strong economic implications on the effect of sovereign risk
increases on firms’ investment activities. While we generally observe significant
spillover in most country aggregates, variation in the transmission mechanism
between Advanced Economies and Emerging and Developing Economies might
be explained by differences in the institutional frameworks, operational indepen-
dence and stock exchange development.
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A Auxiliary Descriptive Statistics
Table 5: Data descriptive statistics on the log-transformed variables
Mean SD Q0.25 Median Q0.75
Log capital expenditures 0.94 2.75 -0.83 0.95 2.83
Log stock return volatility -3.69 0.62 -4.08 -3.74 -3.36
Log return on capital 0.04 0.17 0.01 0.05 0.10
∆ Log sovereign credit default swap 0.03 0.32 -0.14 -0.02 0.12
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of the log-transformed variables. To control for negative
values in the return on capital, the value of 1 is added before the log-transformation takes place.
Table 6: Data descriptive statistics by region
Capital expenditures Annualised stock Return on cap- SOV CDS spread
(in 1,000 USD) return volatility ital (in %) (in basis points)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
AE 83,828 433,289 0.49 0.51 4.55 14.37 82.53 415.79
MAE 147,675 575,566 0.42 0.44 6.07 13.50 39.26 53.42
OAE 36,088 274,027 0.53 0.55 3.42 14.88 114.89 545.50
EA1 88,566 520,000 0.44 0.43 5.45 12.30 177.36 755.14
EE 37,082 388,523 0.50 0.54 6.88 11.92 240.14 448.51
EME 10,684 38,347 0.47 0.47 5.68 11.22 157.44 104.10
EMA 31,452 356,421 0.53 0.54 6.01 11.31 149.29 170.09
LAC 73,591 555,996 0.46 0.62 8.22 12.94 365.71 849.50
EMO 47,829 468,560 0.49 0.51 9.34 12.92 474.92 624.78
Total 63,091 414,677 0.49 0.52 5.59 13.39 152.45 437.67
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of the variables in levels by region. AE: Advanced Economies, MAE:
Major Advanced Economies, OAE: Other Advanced Economies, EA: Euro Area, EE: Emerging and Developing
Economies, EME: Emerging and Developing Europe, EMA: Emerging and Developing Asia, LAC: Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean and EMO: Other Emerging and Developing Economies. 1 Euro Area countries are contained
in Major and Other Advanced Economies.
B The Weighting Procedure
As we find that some countries are inadequately represented in the dataset when
comparing the economic size and the number of observations in the sample, we
weight each observation to bring the dataset closer to the real composition. For
this, we collect annual data on the gross domestic product (GDP) for each country
and calculate the country- and year-specific weight by,
wit,c =
√
srit,c
ssit,c
, (11)
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where srit and ssit are the share of country i’s GDP within the respective country
aggregate c at time t and the share of observations in the sample, respectively.
In doing this, we ensure that observations from under-represented countries are
overweighted in the optimization process, the opposite applies for observations
from countries that are over-represented in the sample.
C Specification Tests
Table 7: Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test for the sovereign CDS spread in
the respective country aggregate
Country aggregate Endogenous variable
κt σt ρt
Advanced Economies 0.000
(0.9946)
0.078
(0.7807)
0.066
(0.7976)
Major Advanced Economies 0.003
(0.9539)
0.179
(0.6720)
0.153
(0.6961)
Other Advanced Economies 0.027
(0.8703)
0.000
(0.9897)
0.145
(0.7035)
Euro Area 0.264
(0.6076)
0.011
(0.9184)
0.095
(0.7578)
Emerging and Developing Economies 0.542
(0.4618)
0.005
(0.9430)
0.004
(0.9476)
Emerging and Developing Europe 0.155
(0.6941)
0.010
(0.9206)
0.189
(0.6640)
Emerging and Developing Asia 1.622
(0.2028)
0.002
(0.9625)
0.004
(0.9474)
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.151
(0.6973)
0.086
(0.7695)
0.438
(0.5079)
Other Emerging and Developing Economies 0.597
(0.4396)
0.043
(0.8351)
0.043
(0.8356)
Note: The table shows the results of a Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test with the null hy-
pothesis that the suspected endogenous regressor can be considered exogenous. In this case, the
test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom. The figures show the test
statistic and the respective p-value in parentheses. κt = capital expenditures, σt = stock return
volatility and ρt = return on capital.
Table 8: Pesaran test for stationarity of the panel series
None Constant Trend
Capital expenditures (κt) −1.85
(0.01)
−2.23
(0.01)
−2.68
(0.01)
Stock return volatility (σt) −3.30
(0.01)
−2.59
(0.01)
−2.92
(0.01)
Return on capital (ρt) −2.87
(0.01)
−2.66
(0.01)
−3.40
(0.01)
Note: The test assumes non-stationarity of the panel series under the
null hypothesis considering a constant, a trend or none of them in the
process. Entries show the test statistics and the respective p-values in
parentheses.
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Table 9: KPSS test for stationarity of the CDS spread series
Country Level 1st. Diff.
Argentina 0.19
(0.10)
0.44
(0.06)
Australia 0.84
(0.01)
0.15
(0.10)
Austria 0.16
(0.10)
0.23
(0.10)
Bahrain 0.60
(0.02)
0.09
(0.10)
Belgium 0.28
(0.10)
0.16
(0.10)
Brazil 0.86
(0.01)
0.15
(0.10)
Bulgaria 0.39
(0.08)
0.14
(0.10)
Canada 0.73
(0.01)
0.07
(0.10)
Chile 0.59
(0.02)
0.12
(0.10)
China 0.51
(0.04)
0.07
(0.10)
Colombia 0.39
(0.08)
0.20
(0.10)
Costa Rica 0.41
(0.07)
0.10
(0.10)
Croatia 0.48
(0.05)
0.15
(0.10)
Cyprus 0.16
(0.10)
0.09
(0.10)
Czech Republic 0.15
(0.10)
0.11
(0.10)
Denmark 0.10
(0.10)
0.09
(0.10)
Egypt 0.46
(0.05)
0.12
(0.10)
Estonia 0.34
(0.10)
0.06
(0.10)
Finland 0.49
(0.04)
0.05
(0.10)
Country Level 1st. Diff.
France 0.61
(0.02)
0.16
(0.10)
Germany 0.53
(0.04)
0.15
(0.10)
Ghana 0.29
(0.10)
0.13
(0.10)
Greece 0.62
(0.02)
0.20
(0.10)
Hong Kong 0.15
(0.10)
0.09
(0.10)
Hungary 0.43
(0.06)
0.17
(0.10)
Iceland 0.40
(0.08)
0.12
(0.10)
India 0.93
(0.01)
0.16
(0.10)
Indonesia 0.56
(0.03)
0.24
(0.10)
Ireland 0.29
(0.10)
0.17
(0.10)
Israel 0.45
(0.06)
0.11
(0.10)
Italy 0.30
(0.10)
0.17
(0.10)
Jamaica 0.14
(0.10)
0.15
(0.10)
Japan 0.38
(0.09)
0.29
(0.10)
Jordan 0.28
(0.10)
0.18
(0.10)
Kazakhstan 0.57
(0.03)
0.08
(0.10)
Latvia 0.46
(0.05)
0.13
(0.10)
Lithuania 0.43
(0.06)
0.09
(0.10)
Malaysia 0.72
(0.01)
0.16
(0.10)
Country Level 1st. Diff.
Malta 0.68
(0.01)
0.17
(0.10)
Mexico 0.67
(0.02)
0.10
(0.10)
Morocco 0.61
(0.02)
0.12
(0.10)
Netherlands 0.61
(0.02)
0.11
(0.10)
New Zealand 0.19
(0.10)
0.13
(0.10)
Nigeria 0.36
(0.09)
0.12
(0.10)
Norway 0.73
(0.01)
0.15
(0.10)
Oman 0.18
(0.10)
0.13
(0.10)
Pakistan 0.81
(0.01)
0.12
(0.10)
Peru 0.58
(0.02)
0.12
(0.10)
Philippines 0.50
(0.04)
0.09
(0.10)
Poland 0.88
(0.01)
0.25
(0.10)
Portugal 0.36
(0.09)
0.22
(0.10)
Qatar 0.95
(0.01)
0.05
(0.10)
Romania 0.60
(0.02)
0.17
(0.10)
Russia 0.40
(0.08)
0.27
(0.10)
Saudi Arabia 0.10
(0.10)
0.09
(0.10)
Serbia 0.20
(0.10)
0.10
(0.10)
Singapore 0.61
(0.02)
0.22
(0.10)
Country Level 1st. Diff.
Slovakia 0.12
(0.10)
0.13
(0.10)
Slovenia 0.56
(0.03)
0.14
(0.10)
South Africa 0.45
(0.06)
0.08
(0.10)
South Korea 0.62
(0.02)
0.12
(0.10)
Spain 0.76
(0.01)
0.14
(0.10)
Sri Lanka 0.72
(0.01)
0.10
(0.10)
Sweden 0.17
(0.10)
0.16
(0.10)
Switzerland 0.79
(0.01)
0.16
(0.10)
Taiwan 0.59
(0.02)
0.19
(0.10)
Thailand 0.68
(0.02)
0.12
(0.10)
Trinidad & Tobago 0.70
(0.01)
0.11
(0.10)
Tunisia 0.56
(0.03)
0.11
(0.10)
Turkey 0.23
(0.10)
0.08
(0.10)
Ukraine 0.49
(0.04)
0.17
(0.10)
Utd. Arab Emirates 0.76
(0.01)
0.21
(0.10)
Utd. Kingdom 0.21
(0.10)
0.19
(0.10)
United States 0.72
(0.01)
0.09
(0.10)
Venezuela 0.69
(0.01)
0.13
(0.10)
Vietnam 0.58
(0.02)
0.14
(0.10)
Notes: The test statistic refers to a KPSS test considering level stationarity under the null hypothesis. The respective p-value (restricted to the interval of 0.01 and 0.10) is displayed in parentheses.
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D Supplemental Estimates
Figure 3: Interim multipliers from an innovation in sovereign risk on firms’ prof-
itability
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II.D Supplemental Estimates
Figure II.D.1: Interim multipliers from an innovation in sovereign risk on firms’ profitability
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Notes: The figures show interim multiplier functions, i.e., the cumulative response of one endogenous variable at time t + i after a
one-standard deviation shock on an exogenous variable at time t .
Notes: ρt = return on capital and ζt = sovereign CDS spread. The figures show interim multiplier functions, i.e., the
cumulative response of one endogenous variable at time t + r after a one-standard deviation shock on an exogenous
variable at time t.
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Table 10: Parameter estimates by country aggregate (1)
AE MAE OAE
κt σt ρt κt σt ρt κt σt ρt
Q1 −0.130
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.024
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.147
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.027
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.113
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.021
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.001)
∗∗∗
Q2 0.006
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.028
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.003)
∗∗∗
Q3 0.027
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.042
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.018
(0.021)
∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.003)
∗∗∗
Q4 0.149
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.164
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.155
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.002)
∗∗∗
κt−1 0.399
(0.011)
∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.388
(0.014)
∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.004)
∗∗∗ 0.423
(0.017)
∗∗∗ −0.015
(0.022)
∗∗∗
κt−2 0.113
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.145
(0.012)
∗∗∗ 0.045
(0.015)
∗∗∗
κt−3 0.038
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.031
(0.012)
∗∗∗ 0.066
(0.018)
∗∗∗
κt−4 0.128
(0.009)
∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.005)
∗∗∗ 0.145
(0.011)
∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.075
(0.014)
∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.006)
∗∗∗
σt−1 −0.066
(0.011)
∗∗∗ 0.318
(0.010)
∗∗∗ −0.056
(0.012)
∗∗∗ 0.314
(0.011)
∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.008)
∗∗∗ −0.094
(0.022)
∗∗∗ 0.330
(0.024)
∗∗∗
σt−2 −0.036
(0.013)
∗∗∗ 0.102
(0.010)
∗∗∗ −0.049
(0.014)
∗∗∗ 0.101
(0.011)
∗∗∗ 0.119
(0.021)
∗∗∗
σt−3 −0.041
(0.011)
∗∗∗ 0.094
(0.005)
∗∗∗ −0.040
(0.012)
∗∗∗ 0.098
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.069
(0.008)
∗∗∗
σt−4 0.018
(0.007)
∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.008)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.007)
∗∗∗ −0.045
(0.026)
∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.016)
∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.012)
∗∗∗
ρt−1 0.253
(0.053)
∗∗∗ −0.082
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.322
(0.020)
∗∗∗ 0.234
(0.069)
∗∗∗ −0.068
(0.011)
∗∗∗ 0.281
(0.027)
∗∗∗ 0.345
(0.071)
∗∗∗ −0.097
(0.023)
∗∗∗ 0.403
(0.021)
∗∗∗
ρt−2 0.151
(0.052)
∗∗∗ 0.086
(0.017)
∗∗∗ 0.193
(0.070)
∗∗∗ 0.069
(0.023)
∗∗∗ −0.044
(0.009)
∗∗∗ 0.094
(0.021)
∗∗∗
ρt−3 0.019
(0.021)
∗∗∗
ρt−4 0.052
(0.042)
∗∗∗ −0.049
(0.019)
∗∗∗ 0.141
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.082
(0.054)
∗∗∗ −0.060
(0.025)
∗∗∗ 0.152
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.107
(0.012)
∗∗∗
ζt−0 0.318
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.322
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.316
(0.012)
∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.004)
∗∗∗
ζt−1 0.107
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.139
(0.004)
∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.004)
∗∗∗
ζt−2 0.103
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.045)
∗∗∗ 0.111
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.063)
∗∗∗ 0.086
(0.004)
∗∗∗ −0.011
(0.030)
∗∗∗
ζt−3 0.065
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.076
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.047
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.060
(0.003)
∗∗∗
ζt−4 −0.047
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.031
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.027)
∗∗∗ −0.055
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.040)
∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.003)
∗∗∗
Notes: κt = capital expenditures, σt = stock return volatility, ρt = return on capital and ζt = sovereign CDS spread. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Blank fields indicate that these parameters can be excluded from the model
without loss of information in the sense of the BIC.AE: Advanced Economies,MAE: Major Advanced Economies,OAE: Other Advanced Economies.
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Table 11: Parameter estimates by country aggregate (2)
EA EE EME
κt σt ρt κt σt ρt κt σt ρt
Q1 −0.151
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.028
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.210
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.241
(0.002)
∗∗∗
Q2 0.024
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.053
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.078
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.008)
∗∗∗
Q3 0.053
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.032
(0.027)
∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.053
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.007)
∗∗∗
Q4 0.179
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.036
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.220
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.249
(0.004)
∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.006)
∗∗∗ −0.022
(0.003)
∗∗∗
κt−1 0.387
(0.022)
∗∗∗ 0.312
(0.010)
∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.023)
∗∗∗ 0.311
(0.019)
∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.048)
∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.006)
∗∗∗
κt−2 0.074
(0.017)
∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.007)
∗∗∗ 0.133
(0.010)
∗∗∗ 0.107
(0.019)
∗∗∗
κt−3 0.064
(0.020)
∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.009)
∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.007)
∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.087
(0.017)
∗∗∗
κt−4 0.125
(0.017)
∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.009)
∗∗∗ 0.108
(0.008)
∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.017)
∗∗∗ 0.072
(0.015)
∗∗∗
σt−1 −0.062
(0.020)
∗∗∗ 0.332
(0.021)
∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.013)
∗∗∗ −0.076
(0.019)
∗∗∗ 0.282
(0.024)
∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.024)
∗∗∗ −0.081
(0.039)
∗∗∗ 0.301
(0.056)
∗∗∗
σt−2 0.137
(0.019)
∗∗∗ 0.106
(0.021)
∗∗∗ 0.131
(0.053)
∗∗∗
σt−3 0.068
(0.009)
∗∗∗ 0.071
(0.007)
∗∗∗
σt−4 −0.068
(0.023)
∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.015)
∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.021)
∗∗∗
ρt−1 0.504
(0.102)
∗∗∗ −0.184
(0.020)
∗∗∗ 0.267
(0.031)
∗∗∗ 0.396
(0.077)
∗∗∗ −0.084
(0.025)
∗∗∗ 0.180
(0.037)
∗∗∗ 0.149
(0.061)
∗∗∗
ρt−2 0.264
(0.086)
∗∗∗ 0.166
(0.037)
∗∗∗ 0.355
(0.079)
∗∗∗ 0.070
(0.035)
∗∗∗ 0.231
(0.160)
∗∗∗ 0.158
(0.055)
∗∗∗
ρt−3 0.236
(0.094)
∗∗∗ 0.074
(0.032)
∗∗∗ 0.409
(0.163)
∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.053)
∗∗∗
ρt−4 −0.093
(0.035)
∗∗∗ 0.204
(0.011)
∗∗∗ 0.120
(0.083)
∗∗∗ 0.168
(0.015)
∗∗∗ −0.113
(0.063)
∗∗∗ 0.231
(0.024)
∗∗∗
ζt−0 0.354
(0.010)
∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.005)
∗∗∗ 0.335
(0.016)
∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.004)
∗∗∗ 0.286
(0.020)
∗∗∗
ζt−1 0.022
(0.005)
∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.004)
∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.004)
∗∗∗
ζt−2 0.069
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.038)
∗∗∗ −0.057
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.079
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.029)
∗∗∗ 0.047
(0.004)
∗∗∗ −0.021
(0.044)
∗∗∗
ζt−3 −0.040
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.080
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.088
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.025)
∗∗∗ 0.052
(0.005)
∗∗∗
ζt−4 −0.006
(0.022)
∗∗∗ −0.088
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.128
(0.002)
∗∗∗
Notes: κt = capital expenditures, σt = stock return volatility, ρt = return on capital and ζt = sovereign CDS spread. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Blank fields indicate that these parameters can be excluded from the model
without loss of information in the sense of the BIC. EA: Euro Area, EE: Emerging and Developing Economies, EME: Emerging and Developing
Europe.
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Table 12: Parameter estimates by country aggregate (3)
EMA LAC EMO
κt σt ρt κt σt ρt κt σt ρt
Q1 −0.223
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.004)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.212
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.004)
∗∗∗ −0.162
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.001)
∗∗∗
Q2 −0.040
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.005)
∗∗∗ 0.074
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.004)
∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.006)
∗∗∗
Q3 −0.017
(0.030)
∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.004)
∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.004)
∗∗∗
Q4 0.251
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.172
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.047
(0.004)
∗∗∗ 0.188
(0.002)
∗∗∗
κt−1 0.309
(0.013)
∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.034)
∗∗∗ 0.322
(0.028)
∗∗∗ 0.300
(0.026)
∗∗∗ −0.050
(0.052)
∗∗∗
κt−2 0.146
(0.013)
∗∗∗ 0.170
(0.021)
∗∗∗ 0.113
(0.037)
∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.058)
∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.017)
∗∗∗
κt−3 0.076
(0.012)
∗∗∗ 0.101
(0.026)
∗∗∗ −0.027
(0.017)
∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.009)
∗∗∗ 0.055
(0.024)
∗∗∗
κt−4 0.122
(0.011)
∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.003)
∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.016)
∗∗∗ 0.073
(0.022)
∗∗∗ 0.083
(0.020)
∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.077)
∗∗∗
σt−1 −0.076
(0.025)
∗∗∗ 0.361
(0.032)
∗∗∗ −0.111
(0.025)
∗∗∗ 0.238
(0.060)
∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.025)
∗∗∗ 0.204
(0.055)
∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.060)
∗∗∗
σt−2 0.143
(0.031)
∗∗∗ 0.059
(0.025)
∗∗∗ 0.129
(0.040)
∗∗∗
σt−3 0.064
(0.011)
∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.017)
∗∗∗ −0.046
(0.046)
∗∗∗ 0.114
(0.015)
∗∗∗
σt−4 0.044
(0.016)
∗∗∗ −0.043
(0.023)
∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.027)
∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.029)
∗∗∗ −0.090
(0.056)
∗∗∗
ρt−1 0.512
(0.120)
∗∗∗ −0.076
(0.037)
∗∗∗ 0.165
(0.028)
∗∗∗ 0.430
(0.176)
∗∗∗ −0.217
(0.058)
∗∗∗ 0.226
(0.096)
∗∗∗ 0.278
(0.239)
∗∗∗ 0.343
(0.233)
∗∗∗
ρt−2 0.446
(0.129)
∗∗∗ 0.073
(0.027)
∗∗∗ 0.269
(0.176)
∗∗∗ 0.116
(0.091)
∗∗∗ 0.369
(0.181)
∗∗∗ 0.265
(0.015)
∗∗∗ −0.144
(0.151)
∗∗∗
ρt−3 0.168
(0.161)
∗∗∗ 0.064
(0.030)
∗∗∗ 0.075
(0.093)
∗∗∗ 0.224
(0.146)
∗∗∗ 0.183
(0.191)
∗∗∗
ρt−4 0.121
(0.013)
∗∗∗ 0.218
(0.157)
∗∗∗ 0.176
(0.031)
∗∗∗ 0.277
(0.159)
∗∗∗ 0.171
(0.091)
∗∗∗
ζt−0 0.237
(0.011)
∗∗∗ −0.020
(0.004)
∗∗∗ 0.396
(0.028)
∗∗∗ 0.393
(0.085)
∗∗∗
ζt−1 −0.009
(0.004)
∗∗∗ −0.083
(0.012)
∗∗∗ 0.061
(0.012)
∗∗∗ −0.111
(0.009)
∗∗∗ 0.133
(0.008)
∗∗∗
ζt−2 0.067
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.045)
∗∗∗ −0.116
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.090
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.052)
∗∗∗
ζt−3 0.102
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.031)
∗∗∗ 0.133
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.044
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.065)
∗∗∗
ζt−4 −0.053
(0.001)
∗∗∗ −0.047
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.083
(0.002)
∗∗∗ −0.104
(0.001)
∗∗∗ 0.158
(0.002)
∗∗∗
Notes: κt = capital expenditures, σt = stock return volatility, ρt = return on capital and ζt = sovereign CDS spread. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Blank fields indicate that these parameters can be excluded from the model
without loss of information in the sense of the BIC. EMA: Emerging and Developing Asia, LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean and EMO: Other
Emerging and Developing Economies.
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